The study analyzes the effect of inflation volatility on growth in the presence of different degrees of institutional development. A non-linear growth regression specification using System GMM procedure on a sample of 37 countries over the period 1989-2006 is estimated. While the level of inflation was found not to have a significant effect on growth, which is in line with previous studies; inflation volatility does significantly impact growth even for countries with moderately high levels on inflation. In addition and in contrast with the results of Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Easterly (2004) , the study finds that policies, particularly inflation volatility, does not act as a proxy for institutions. Improving institutions will have a statistical significant positive impact on growth which will help to reduce the negative impact of inflation volatility.
Introduction
Many studies address the role of the economic policy versus the role of institutions in growth.
However, few of these studies concentrate on the role of the second moments of the policy instead of the policy itself in affecting growth. In this paper, the role of inflation volatility versus the role of institutions in growth is studied by adding the volatility of inflation and its interaction term with legal and financial institutions to the growth regression. The aim is to determine how the total effect of inflation volatility on growth is affected by the level of institutional development.
The main contribution of this paper is that it shows that while inflation level does not significantly affect growth--a finding in line with previous studies--inflation volatility does significantly affect growth. Thus, inflation volatility does affect growth even in countries with moderately high levels of inflation. This paper also finds that improving either legal or financial institutions will statistically significantly reduce the harmful effects of inflation volatility on growth. In addition and in contrast to the results of Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen (2003) and Easterly (2004) , the paper shows that inflation volatility does not act as a proxy for either type of institution. Finally, this paper shows that the contribution of institutions in reducing the damage of inflation volatility on growth is relatively small and insignificant in institutionally developed countries, but relatively big and significant in institutionally poor countries.
The Chinn and Ito (2005) indices of legal and financial institutions, "LEGAL1" and "LEGAL2" respectively, were estimated for the sample of countries and time period under study.
The LEGAL1 index was estimated using the principal component analysis from three indices: bureaucracy, corruption, and law and order. Similarly, the LEGAL2 index was constructed from four indices: the protection of creditors' rights, the protection of shareholders' rights, transparency of the company's account, and strong enforcement of laws.
Using a cross-section of 37 developed and developing countries from1989-2006 this paper's results show that the impact of institutions is significant up to the countries on the 80 th percentile, for either LEGAL1 or LEGAL2. A one standard deviation reduction in inflation volatility increases growth by about 0.93% and 0.90% in countries with the worst level of legal and financial institutions, respectively. Furthermore, a one standard deviation reduction in inflation volatility, increases growth by only about 0.13% and 0.08% for countries on the 80 th percentile of legal and financial institutions, respectively. Finally, for countries with the best level of either legal or financial institutions, improving institutions will have no statistically significant effect on growth. This paper's empirical model is theoretically based on Choi, Smith and Boyd (1995) . In their paper, a theoretical model was developed and the inter-linkages between inflation, market frictions, inflation volatility, and growth were presented to prove that high inflation leads to high inflation volatility, which in turn leads to more financial frictions in the market and thereby inhibits growth. The type of friction assumed in this model is information asymmetry. High inflation will reduce the real value of interest rates, making it cheaper for those borrowers who
were not borrowing at the high real interest rates. Accordingly, there is a higher demand for credits by such borrowers. Credit owners on the other hand would fear lending them, and they would prefer to ration credits. Greater credit rationing increases inflation volatility, which in turn affects the real activity. So the higher is inflation, the more information asymmetry, the more inflation volatility, and the lower is the real growth rate.
The model used by Choi, Smith, and Boyd (1995) analyzes how the transmission of the effect of inflation to real growth through the financial market depends on whether or not we are to analyze a relatively high average inflation country vs. a relatively low average inflation country. A high average inflation country will experience relatively more financial frictions than a low average inflation country. For the former country, a higher inflation will exert a strong negative impact on growth; in the latter country, this negative impact might not appear at all. As noted in Choi, Smith, and Boyd (1995) , the low average inflation country will experience a "Mundell-Tobin effect", where higher inflation leads to more growth as credit rationing might not appear in this country's financial markets. Accordingly, there is a threshold limit for inflation beyond which it will reduce growth; this is because there is a threshold limit for market frictions, beyond which it will adversely affect growth.
The relation between inflation and growth has been extensively studied in many empirical papers. Although the general consensus among economists is that inflation has a statistically significant negative impact on growth, as Fisher (1993) , Motley (1994) and Barro (1995) have
shown, other economists conclude that the result is not robust. Levine and Renelt (1992) showed that inflation growth relation is very sensitive to the regression specification. A cross section study by Levine and Zervos (1993) found that the growth-inflation relation depends on a few outliers in their sample of countries, basically Uganda and Nicaragua. Also, Bruno and Easterly (1995) found that the growth inflation relation depends on a threshold level of inflation of 40%; conversely, in countries with annual inflation below 40%, inflation's impact on growth is insignificant. In addition, Clark (1997) concluded that although the results show a general statistically significant negative relation between inflation and growth, this relation is not robust to either the change in the sample of countries or to the change in the time period under study.
In contrast to the level of inflation, the harmful effects of inflation volatility was highlighted long ago by Friedman (1977) ; he found that although the long term monetary policy neutrality holds in the level of the policy, it does not hold in its second moment. Levine and Zervos (1993) studied the separate effects of the level and the volatility of inflation on growth. They concluded that neither the level nor the volatility of inflation is robustly correlated with growth. On the other hand, using panel data, Orphanides and Judson (1996) found that both inflation and inflation volatility were robustly negatively correlated with growth for the high inflation countries; they concluded that a good policy reduces the level of inflation and at the same time stabilizes inflation. In addition, using the square root of the conditional variance of inflation from a GARCH (1,1) model as the measure of inflation uncertainty, Coulson and Robbins (1985) found a positive association between this measure of inflation uncertainty and US economic performance. Jansen (1989) , on the other hand, found no significant relationship between the two variables. The results of Coulson and Robbins (1985) were not, however, confirmed by Grier and Perry (2000) and Grier, Henry, Olekalns, and Shields (2004) , who reported a negative relation between inflation uncertainty and growth in the US.
The literature on the importance of strong institutions, either legal or financial institutions, is rapidly growing. This literature was started by La Porta, Florencio, Andrei and Robert (1997) , which showed the importance of legal and financial institutions for a firm's decisions. Rodrik (1999) showed that countries with the sharpest drop in growth after 1975 had weak institutions, as measured by rule of law, democratic rights, and social safety nets. Acemoglu et al. (2003) showed that institutions are more important for growth than economic policy. Once institutions variable has been included in the regression, the coefficient of the macroeconomic policy turns insignificant. Easterly (2004) confirmed these results.
In contrast to Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Easterly (2004) , in a cross section of 91 countries, Fatas and Mihov (2005) studied the effect of fiscal policy volatility, institutions, and growth.
Their results showed that fiscal policy volatility has a significant negative impact on growth; in addition, they showed that institutions affect growth only through their effect on policy, particularly the policy's volatility.
In line with the results of Acemoglu et al.(2003) and Easterly (2004) , using a panel data on hundred countries from 1975 -1999 found a positive association between greater fragmentation, polarization, and political instability as forms of market frictions and inflation volatility. Veiga and Aisen also found that forms of market frictions are the main determinants of inflation volatility.
On the micro-economic level, Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) showed from their survey on new firms in post communist countries that strong property rights affects the firms' decision to reinvest their profits. Furthermore, using data on thousands of firms in 80 countries, Alberto and Mark (2006) concluded that volatility has a negative effect on the firm's growth; this negative effect is magnified by weak institutions. In their paper, volatility is defined as the volatility in the firm's decisions to enter new projects, which in turn depends on governmental inability to create credible policy. On the other hand, institutions were defined as high entry barriers. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2006) found that the financial constraints faced by firms depend on the firm's size. Large firms are expected to face fewer financial constraints. In addition, they found that firms located in countries with well developed legal and financial institutions face fewer financial constraints, and these institutions are the essential driving force for economic development.
In what follows, the empirical specification of a model is presented that extends previous studies and demonstrates that the volatility of the policy, not the level of the policy, has more impact on growth. Next, the growth regression model is expanded by including the effect of institutions; the model is then used to compute the total effect of volatility of inflation on growth under different degrees of institutional development.
This paper is organized into seven sections. Section 2 presents the empirical specification of the model. Section 3 describes our data and section 4 discusses the estimation results. Section 5 calculates the total effect of inflation volatility on growth. Section 6 concludes the paper and section 7 includes the references. Finally, the appendix appears near the end of the paper.
Empirical Specification
Most of the research in economic growth focusing on endogenous growth models started in early 1990's. These models assume that growth arises from human capital accumulation. The endogenous growth models were found to be important for analyzing various government policy measures on long run growth in the economy. Among many other economists, Lucas (1988), Romer (1990) , King and Rebelo (1990), and Rebelo (1991) were the first to analyze the long run implications of these models on economic growth.
In line with the endogenous growth theory models and for the analysis of this paper, this section empirically estimates a growth model that is a function of the initial level of per capita GDP, the level of inflation, volatility of inflation, investment in human capital, and institutional development. In addition, the empirical growth model of this section includes a proxy for trade openness that was found by many endogenous growth models, as in Young (1991 ), Grossman and Helpman (1991 ), Eicher (1993 ), and Lee (1993 , to positively contribute to long-run growth.
The focus of this paper's empirical model is to analyze the effect of inflation volatility on growth in a model that controls for the level of legal and institutional variables. Following Caselli, Equivel and Lefort (1996), Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) , the growth model is estimated using dynamic panel System GMM.
Equation (1) provides the general form of the empirical model;
where the subscripts i and t represent the country and the time period, respectively. The variable t i y , is the log GDP per capita. Hence, the left hand side of the above equation represents the log difference of the real GDP per capita over a period of  years; in other words it represents the growth rate over the period, where  = 3. The explanatory variables consist of
represents the beginning of the period GDP per capita;
CV , is the set of control variables that are measured either at the beginning of the period or as an average over the  period. This set of control variables includes level of inflation at the beginning of the period, log inflation volatility at the beginning of the period, the average over the period of the current account balance as a percentage to GDP as a proxy of trade openness, and the average over the period years of schooling as a proxy of human capital investment. This is in addition to the country specific effects and time period dummies that are represented by i  and t d respectively.
The System GMM proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) , Blundell and Bond (1998), and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000) overcomes the bias problems of the difference GMM estimator. It works by basically stacking together Equation (1) above with Equation (2) below,
The main reason for differencing Equation (1) is to eliminate the country specific or unobserved effects following Arellano and Bond (1991) . In addition to the assumptions of the Difference GMM 2 , the System GMM assumes that the first difference of the dependent variable and the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the country specific effects, which provides the following two extra moments conditions about the correlation between the dependent variable and the error term and the set of the independent variables and the error term,
where t i X , is the set of all the explanatory variables of Equation (1). In order to satisfy these additional moments conditions, the correct set of instruments are chosen by regressing the dependent variable and each of the explanatory variables in levels, each variable in a turn, on all the possible lags of the dependent variable and the explanatory variables in first difference 2 More details on Difference GMM are available in Traub (2006 (Sargan 1988) , tests that the moments conditions of Equation (3) above are satisfied.
Concerning the relevance test, the relevant set of instrument for the base growth regression is the second and the third lag of the following: the beginning of the period GDP, the beginning of the period inflation, and the beginning of the period log inflation volatility. This is in addition to the second lag of the average trade volume as a percentage of GDP, and the second lag of the average over the period years of schooling. 
 
Infvol , is the beginning of the period inflation volatility and the term Similarly, Equation (1) 
The total effect of inflation volatility on growth is then estimated by adding the coefficient of inflation volatility 2  to the coefficient of the interaction term 3  times the factor interacted with volatility. Accordingly, in Equation (4), the total effect of inflation volatility equals
when interacted with the LEGAL1 index and equivalently
Equation (5) when interacted with the LEGAL2 index.
Data
The data set was constructed as a panel of country observations from the data base of the World Bank "World Development Indicators" and includes 37 countries from [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . In order to analyze the long-term effects of inflation volatility on growth, the data were averaged into three years' time periods. Data are thus available for six time series observations for each country.
The set of control variables is selected considering both their importance as growth determinants per se and their potential for affecting the growth response of inflation volatility.
The control set includes variables that vary both across countries and over time, as well as variables that vary only across countries. Among the former, the set includes the beginning of the period inflation rate, the beginning of the period inflation volatility, the average over the period current account balance as a percentage of GDP as a measure of trade openness, the beginning of the period years of schooling to account for human capital investment, and the LEGAL1 index and its three components: bureaucracy, corruption, and law and order. Among variables that vary only across countries, the set includes the LEGAL2 index and its four indices: creditors' rights, shareholders' rights, enforcement, and accounts.
The growth data was computed as the log difference of GDP per capita normalized by the length of the period. Data for the years of schooling were collected from the Barro and Lee (2000) data set. Following Coulson and Robins (1985) , the data on inflation volatility was calculated as the log of the square root of the conditional variance series of inflation calculated by GARCH(1,1) model. As noted in Clark (1997) , measuring inflation volatility as the coefficient of variation of the level of inflation assures that the level of inflation is not correlated with its variance and hence will not pose any imperfect multicollinearity issues in estimating the growth regression when both the level and volatility of inflation are included.
As mentioned previously, the Chinn and Ito (2005) indices LEGAL1 and LEGAL2 were estimated for the sample and time period under study in this paper. These two indices were developed using the principal component analysis. The first type of institutions index, LEGAL1 3 , contains the measures related to the general development of the legal systems. It was estimated by the principal component analysis of four indices: corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy.
The corruption index ranges from 1 to 6, where a highly corrupted country takes an index of 1 and the lowest corrupted country takes an index of 6. For instance, Belgium has an index of 6, while Egypt has an index of 1. Next, the law and order index ranges from 1 to 6; the higher the index, the stricter is the criminal justice system. This index refers to a political platform that supports a strict criminal justice system, especially in relation to violent crime and property crimes, through harsher criminal penalties. These penalties may include longer terms of imprisonment, mandatory sentencing, and in some countries, capital punishment. Finally, the bureaucracy index ranges from zero to 4, where the higher the index the less is the bureaucracy in the economy. The data on the three legal indices were collected from La Porta et al. (1998) .
The LEGAL1 index combines those three indices using the principal component analysis, and it ranges from -4.23 up to 1.73 where again the higher the index, the more developed are the legal institutions.
The second type of institutions index, LEGAL2 4 , contains legal indices governing financial transactions. From here after, it is referred to as the financial institutions index. Again, this index was estimated using the principal component analysis of the four indices: protection of creditors' rights, effectiveness of the legal system in enforcing contracts, protection of shareholders' rights, and comprehensiveness of company reports. The index of creditors' protection ranges from 0 to 4, where more protection for creditors implies a higher index. It is composed of the variables that incorporate the automatic stay proposition on the assets of a failing firm, the continuation of the old managers in a reorganization process, restrictions upon reorganization, and the seniority system of secured creditors. Next, the index of the degree of law enforcement ranges from 4.87 to 9.99; again the higher the index, the stricter is the system of law enforcement. This index consists of the average of the efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, risk of expropriation, and risk of contract repudiation. The third sub-index, the index of shareholders' rights, ranges from 0.05 to 5.10 where the higher the index, the greater the protection of shareholders' rights. This index is composed of the sum of the one share-one-vote, proxy by mail, shares not blocked before meeting, cumulative voting/proportional presentation, oppressed minorities, preemptive right to new issues, and percentage of share capital to call an emergency shareholder meeting less than ten percent 5 . Finally, the accounts index ranges from 24 to 83, where a higher index implies more transparency and comprehensiveness of the reports. The data on these four subindices of the LEGAL2 index were collected from the International Country Risk Guide-ICRG (country data). The LEGAL2 index ranges from -2.90 up to 1.83.
It is important to note that the data set countries were chosen on the basis of the availability of the data on the components of LEGAL1 and LEGAL2. The results might then be seen as conservative, for restricting the data set to 37 countries might cause sample selection bias. The list of countries included in the sample is reported in Table A .1 of the appendix. As shown in this table, the countries included in the sample consist of two sets: low income developing countries and developed countries. Most of the OECD countries were included in the sample. Additionally, many of the countries in the sample are Latin American. Furthermore, the sample includes some countries that faced economic or financial crises in the past: Argentina (1999 ), Brazil (1980 , Mexico (1994) , Uruguay (2002) , Korea (1997 ), Thailand (1997 ), and Turkey (1980 's, 1994 -2001 .
Estimation Results
Using dynamic panel two-step System GMM with time dummies in the level equation Table 1 below. The Table consists of five columns representing the results of five regressions. In each regression, the dependent variable is per-capita real GDP growth. In estimating the model the top 10% of the volatility distribution was discarded from the data. Doing so removes the impact of the outliers on the estimation bias based on a non-subjective criterion.
The results presented in Column 1 show an expected statistical significant negative effect of the initial level of GDP at the beginning of the growth period. As the beginning of the period GDP increases by 1%, growth over the period decreases by about 0.62%. This result confirms the convergence hypothesis; countries relatively advanced in development will grow slower than those countries lagging behind.
Adding the beginning of the period inflation to the regression as shown in Column 2 of the same table, the coefficient of inflation shows no sign of statistical significance. This result is in line with the implication of the theoretical model of Choi, Smith, and Boyd (1995) on which the empirical model of this paper is based: there is a threshold limit for inflation beyond which it will exert negative impact on growth. In addition, the insignificance of the coefficient of inflation confirms the findings of Bruno and Easterly (1995) that after excluding inflation levels above 40% from their sample, inflation contributes no statistical significance to growth. As noted in their paper "… if we omit the set of countries that had inflation at some point pass 40 percent, then we fail to detect any significant association between inflation and growth". By looking at the data on the level of inflation for the 37 countries over the period of the study, it is found about 93% of the inflation observations are below 40%, a relatively moderate level of inflation that could lead to harmful effects on growth.
This finding is in line with the results of Bullard and Keating (1994) ; inflation will exert negative impact on growth only in countries with relatively high initial level of inflation.
Furthermore, the results of Clark (1997) demonstrated that inflation does not robustly negatively affect growth. And as noted in Levine and Renelt (1992) , the relation between inflation and growth is not robust to the changes in the regression specification, the sample of countries, or the time period under study.
Adding inflation volatility to the model, Column 3 shows that its coefficient is statistically significant with an expected negative sign where a one percent increase in inflation volatility at the beginning of the 3   period results in a reduction in growth by about 0.042% over the period. This result is an important contribution of this paper: while the level of inflation does not significantly affect growth, which is in line with previous studies, inflation volatility does significantly affect growth.
Column 4 shows the results of adding the proxy for openness to the growth regression. As can be noted from the table above, the coefficient of the initial level of GDP and the coefficient of the volatility of inflation both remain significant and with the expected sign. In addition, the coefficient of openness appears significant and with the expected positive sign. A one percent increase in the percentage of the current account to GDP at the beginning of the period leads to about a 0.028% increase in growth over the three year period.
Finally, Column 5 shows the results of adding the beginning of the period years of schooling to account for human capital investment. As obvious from above, the coefficient of the years of schooling appears statistically significant and positive. This matches the results of previous studies by Edwards (2001) and Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2003) were human capital was found to have a significant positive impact on growth. As shown in Column 5, a one year increase in the beginning of the period years of schooling leads to an increase the growth over the three years period by about 0.176%.
For all regression results of this Table, the p-value from the Sargan test of the validity of instruments indicates a failure to reject the null that instrumental variables are uncorrelated to some set of residuals, and therefore the instruments pass the test and are valid by this criterion.
In all the regressions of Table 1 above, the coefficient of the volatility of inflation was statistically significant and had the expected negative sign. On the other hand, the level of inflation was statistically insignificant in all regressions. This shows that the impact of inflation volatility is more important to growth than the impact of the level of inflation; this confirms the results of Stockman (1981 ) De Gregorio (1993 and Jones and Manuelli (1993) that inflation volatility significantly harms growth. The intuition here is that if the level of inflation is high but predictable, people can change their behavior and react accordingly, thereby avoiding high inflation's negative effect. However, if the level of inflation is unpredictable, people cannot be certain about what the future holds for them. Therefore, the future will not be safe to welcome domestic and international investments. Local and foreign investors will have no incentive to invest in the country. Hence, a high inflation volatility will have harmful effects on capital accumulation and thereby growth. The first question of the study, therefore, is answered: the volatility of the policy is more important to growth than the policy itself. Table A .5 of appendix shows the interaction of the inflation volatility with the other determinants of growth included in the base model. For the sake of brevity, Table A.5 reports the coefficients of inflation volatility and the coefficients of the interaction terms. As shown in the table, the coefficients of the interaction terms were statistically significant only with the expected sign for both the interaction with inflation and the interaction with openness. The coefficients of the interaction terms with the beginning of the period GDP and the average years of schooling were not statistically significant.
As Column 2 of Table A.5 shows, the interaction of inflation volatility with inflation is statistically significant and with the expected negative sign. A high beginning of the period inflation will increase the negative impact of the beginning of the period inflation volatility over the period. A one percent increase in inflation leads to an increase in the negative impact of inflation volatility on growth by about 0.047%. Furthermore, Column 3 shows the results when the base growth model was interacted with the proxy of openness. This interaction term appears statistically significant with the positive expected sign. A one percent increase in the percentage of current account to GDP will reduce the negative impact of inflation volatility on growth by about 0.078%. (4) and (5) where Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show the results of adding the coefficients of the interaction terms of inflation volatility with LEGAL1 and LEGAL2 respectively. As shown in both columns, the addition of the legal and financial interactions does not change the sign or significance of the control variables. The initial GDP/capita, inflation, volatility, openness, and human capital retained the same sign and significance as in Table 1 . The sign of inflation, however, showed a positive significant sign. A possible reason for this result is the fact that most of the inflation data, for the 37 countries over the period of the study, are from moderate inflation countries where about 93% of the data are below 40%. Furthermore, most of these data are less than 10%. In the Choi, Smith, and Boyd (1995) model, the low average inflation country will experience a "Mundell-Tobin effect", in which higher inflation leads to more growth as credit rationing might not appear at all in the given nation's financial market.
Additionally, the coefficient of inflation volatility remains negatively significant and the coefficient of the interaction terms is statistically significant and positive as expected. Thus the result of Table 2 above confirm that a country with better institutions will have less harmful effects of inflation volatility on growth. For instance, a one unit increase in the LEGAL1 index or the LEGAL2 index will reduce the negative impact of inflation volatility on growth by about 0.21% or 0.28%, respectively. Table 2 show that the negative significant coefficient of inflation volatility exceeds the positive coefficients of the interaction terms of either the LEGAL1 or LEGAL2 index. This implies that the total effect of inflation volatility on growth is less negative when interacted with an improvement in legal or financial institutions.
It is worth noting that the results of
Furthermore, it is important to note that once the interaction terms are included in the regression, what really matters is the significance of the total effect of inflation volatility, coefficient of volatility plus coefficient of the interaction term, and not simply the significance of each separate coefficient. The computation of the total effects of inflation volatility is analyzed in more detail in the next section.
Focusing on the components of LEGAL1 Table A.6 of the appendix summarizes the results of estimating Equation (4) where the interaction terms of corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality were added to the base model, each one in a turn. In all of the three regressions of Table A .6, the coefficient of inflation volatility remains statistically significant with the expected negative magnitude. Column 1 of the table shows that the coefficient of the interaction term of inflation volatility with corruption is statistically significant with a positive expected magnitude. Based on the results shown in the table, a one unit reduction in the corruption index reduces the negative impact of inflation volatility on growth by about 0.065%.
As shown in Column 2 of the same table, the interaction term of inflation volatility with law and order index is statistical significant and positive as expected. A one unit increase in the law and order index reduces the harmful effects of inflation volatility on growth by about 0.101%.
Finally, the interaction term of inflation volatility with bureaucracy as shown in Column 3 is not statistically significant.
Similarly, Table A.7 shows the results of estimating Equation (5) with the interaction terms of inflation volatility with the components of LEGAL2: creditors' rights, shareholders' rights, enforcement, and transparency of accounts. These sub-indices are again included as interaction terms with inflation volatility, each one at a time.
As is clear from the results of this table, all the coefficients of inflation volatility and interaction terms with creditors' rights, enforcement, and accounts are statistically significant with the expected sign. A one unit increase in the index of creditors' rights, enforcement, and accounts will lead to a reduction in the negative impact of inflation volatility on growth by about 0.15%, 0.11%, and 0.02%, respectively. In addition, neither the coefficient of inflation volatility nor its interaction term with shareholders' rights index appears significant. This might be because of the high correlation in the data between the two variables that reaches 94%; there is a high probability that the two coefficients cancel each other.
Total Effect of Inflation Volatility
Using the results of Table 2, the total effect of a one standard deviation increase in inflation volatility at each level of legal and financial institutions indices is computed. From the results of the first column, the total effect of inflation volatility was calculated when interacted with the LEGAL1 index.
Recall that the LEGAL1 index falls in the interval [-4.23, 1.73] where the higher the value, the more developed is the level of legal institutions. The first column of Table 3 below shows the quintiles of the index. As is clear from the results of the Table, the higher the LEGAL1 index, the less is the negative total effect of inflation volatility on growth. This total effect is statistically significant and with the expected signs at all percentiles except for the top quintile of the index, where the effect was not significant. For instance, a country like Peru in the early 1990's was on the 20 th percentile of the LEGAL1 index, where a one standard deviation increase in inflation volatility leads to about 0.73% increase in growth. As a result of the improvement to its bureaucracy system, it moved up to the 40 th percentile of the LEGAL1 index, where a one standard deviation increase in inflation volatility leads to only 0.53% drop in growth rate. Similarly, an improvement in Singapore's legal institutions from being at the 60 th percentile of the LEGAL1 index in the period 1989-91 to the 80 th percentile in the period 2004-06 leads to a reduction in the negative impact of inflation volatility on growth by about 60%, as shown in the table below. In addition, from Table 3 the threshold level of LEGAL1 index is computed by solving for it in an equation in which the coefficient of inflation volatility is added to the interaction term between inflation volatility and the index then equating the sum to zero. The threshold level of LEGAL1 in the sample is equal to 1.34; a country with an index of this value will have a zero total effect of inflation volatility on growth. In other words, the positive effect of good institutions outweighs the negative impact of inflation volatility. This is besides that the negative impact of inflation volatility is small since on average countries with good institutions have relatively low inflation volatility. For instance, countries like Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States all fall into this category.
Similarly, Table 4 shows the computation of the total effect of inflation volatility when interacted with the LEGAL2 index. Recall that the LEGAL2 index falls in the interval [-2.90, 1.83] where the higher the value, the more developed is the level of financial institutions. As Table 4 shows, the total negative effects of inflation volatility on growth decreases as the index increases or as countries develop their financial institutions. For instance, in Mexico--on the 40 th percentile of the LEGAL2 index--a one standard deviation increase in the inflation volatility will lead to a drop in growth by about 0.49%. The threshold level of LEGAL2 is equal to 1.23; a country such as France with this index value has exactly zero total effect of inflation volatility on growth. This zero total effect is, however, statistically insignificant. Moreover, a country with an index value above 1.23 has a positive total effect of inflation volatility on growth. Good examples in this respect are Finland, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These countries have relatively developed financial institutions and relatively low inflation volatility. Combining these two effects, the total effect of inflation volatility is positive but not statistically significant.
Concerning the total effect of inflation volatility when interacted with the sub-indices of LEGAL1 index: Table A.8 through Table A .10 of the appendix show detailed calculations for the total growth effect of inflation volatility when interacted with each of the components of LEGAL1 index: corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy respectively. instance, which is on the minimal value of this index), will have a total effect of about 0.43%. Similarly, Tables A.11 through Table A. 14 calculate the total effects of inflation volatility when interacted with the sub-indices of the LEGAL2 index: creditors' rights, shareholders' rights, enforcement, and accounts respectively. In all of the four total effects, an improvement in the sub-index reduces the harmful impact of inflation volatility on growth. Mexico which is on the lowest value of this index, a one unit increase in the standard deviation of inflation volatility leads to a drop in growth by about 0.38%. On the other hand, in a country such New Zealand, which has relatively developed laws that protects creditors' rights, this total effect is only about 0.03%. Surprisingly, the total effect turns positive and significant for countries such Singapore and the UK on the maximum value of this index. This suggests that if creditors' rights are well protected, its positive impact can outweigh any negative impact of inflation volatility on growth.
From Table A .12, it is clear that although the improvement in the shareholder's rights index leads to a statistically significant reduction on the negative impact of inflation volatility on growth, the reduction is very small and does not change significantly from a country on the 20 th percentile of this index as compared to a country on the 80 th percentile. For example, the total effect of a country on the 20 th percentile such as Turkey will have a total growth effect of 0.1626% for each one standard deviation drop in inflation volatility which is very close to 0.1621% for a country on the 80 th percentile, such as the U.S.
As for the total growth effect of interacting the enforcement index with inflation volatility, 
Conclusion
Using a cross-section of 37 developed and developing countries over the period (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , the result from this paper shows that inflation volatility--not simply the level of inflation--is an important factor in determining growth in a developing economy. In addition, the degree of development in legal and financial institutions is also important, and developing economies can experience faster growth by reforming their institutions at the same time they reduce inflation volatility in their economy.
Furthermore, the results of this paper show that, in contrast to the results of Easterly (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2003) , macroeconomic policy does not act as a proxy for institutions. The addition of the interaction term of either legal or financial institutions with inflation volatility does not change the sign and significance of inflation volatility coefficient as well as the sign and significance of the institutions coefficients. Improving institutions, legal or financial, has a positive significant impact on the channel through which inflation volatility affects growth. A high degree of corruption, weak enforcement of laws, high levels of bureaucracy, lack of protection to creditors' or shareholders' rights, and lack of respect for the law all prevent reducing the negative impact of inflation volatility on growth. Investors in general are willing to invest in a country when they feel that their rights are protected and when the country's laws allow investors direct control on the goods provided by the debtors as collateral, in case those debtors default on their debts. Additionally, investors are willing to provide credit when they feel that there is transparency in the companies' accounts. All such types of incentives will help provide the finance needed by entrepreneurs to either start new projects or expand current ones, leading to increase in growth.
The results of the paper also show that the impact of institutions is significant up to countries on the 80 th percentile for either LEGAL1 or LEGAL2 where improving institutions has a greater impact in the institutionally underdeveloped countries relative to institutionally developed ones.
A one standard deviation reduction in inflation volatility leads to an increase in growth of about 0.93% and 0.90% in countries with the worst levels of legal and financial institutions, respectively. Furthermore, a one standard deviation reduction in inflation volatility leads to an increase in growth of only about 0.13% and 0.08% for countries on the 80 th percentile of legal and financial institutions, respectively
Future research in this area might examine the channel through which inflation volatility and institutions affect growth. It can concentrate on the investment channel or the sovereign debt rating channel and can quantify the impact of the changes in sovereign debt rating on the average annual long term bond yield which in turn affects economic growth. The regression results show that across these two regressions, the coefficients of 2  's are statistically insignificant. Accordingly, the null hypothesis that growth leads to or causes inflation volatility is rejected. In addition, the coefficients of the interaction terms proved to be statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the results of repeating the same regression with the interaction terms of the seven sub-indices of LEGAL1 and LEGAL2, each one at a time, again
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show statistically insignificant coefficients of growth when controlled for the seven interaction terms. Hence the assumption on which the System GMM is based--that reverse causality does not exist or that inflation volatility--is predetermined for growth is confirmed.
B. Regular Panel Estimation
As a robustness check on the results, in this sub-section the base regression is re-estimated using regular panel estimation with period dummies and cross-section fixed effects. This means that the least squares regression model is estimated using panel data. Accordingly, some of the coefficients are expected to be different, for the least squares method tends to have a positive bias 8 , while the System GMM is known for its small bias property 9 . Hence in using the OLS, it is important to focus on the coefficients of the main variables, such as inflation, inflation volatility, and the interaction terms of inflation volatility with legal and financial institutions indices. If those coefficients have the same sign and are close in magnitudes in both the System GMM and OLS estimations, then this would suggest that the results are robust.
As shown in Table A .15 the first column shows the results of estimating the base model when interacted with the LEGAL1 index. Column 2 of the same table shows the results of the base model when it is interacted with the LEGAL2 index. The results from these two columns confirm the results of the dynamic panel System GMM. All the coefficients appeared to be of the same sign and close in magnitudes to the previous results. The coefficient of inflation appeared again to be not statistically significant. On the other hand, the coefficient of inflation volatility showed a statistically significant negative coefficient. The coefficients of both interaction terms are again to be statistically significant and positive. Table A .15, the total effect of a one standard deviation increase in inflation volatility when interacted with LEGAL1 and LEGAL2 were calculated and presented in Table A.16 and Table A .17, respectively. As is clear from these two tables, the total effects were again with the expected sign but statistically significant only up to the 60 th percentile; the total effects were not up to the 80 th percentile, as was the case with the System GMM estimation.
Using the results of
Generally, however, the results are confirmed as robust. In addition, the base model was estimated with the interaction terms of the sub-indices of the LEGAL1 and the LEGAL2, each one in a turn. The interaction terms of corruption, law and order, and accounts were again statistically significant and with the expected sign, as were the cases using the System GMM. The interaction terms of bureaucracy and shareholders' rights are again statistically insignificant. The interaction terms of creditors' rights and enforcement do not prove to be robustly significant.
